transfer was: (A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; (B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and (C) made according to ordinary business terms. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2); In re Martin, 184 B.R. at 985. Following BAPCPA's effective date, the defendant need prove only that the debt was incurred in the ordinary course of business and that either the transfer was either subjectively ordinary (pre-BAPCPA section 547(c)(2)(B), post-BAPCPA section 547(c)(2)(A)) or objectively ordinary (pre-BAPCPA section (547)(c)(2)(C), post-BAPCPA section 547(c)(2)(B)). This exception operates as an affirmative defense such that the Defendant bears the burden of proving each of the three elements. 11 U.S.C. § 547(g); Miller v. Fla. Mining & Materials (In re A.W. & Associs., Inc.), 136 F.3d 1439, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998). Each element of section 547(c)(2) must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors of Toy King Distribs., Inc. v. Liberty Sav. Bank, FSB (In re Toy King Distribs.), 256 B.R. 1, 113 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000); Logan v. Basic Distribution Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d 239, 244 (6th Cir. 1992). Because of the important policies served by preference law, courts have repeatedly held that the exceptions contained in section 547(c), should be narrowly construed. Toy King, 256 B.R. at 113; Hassett v. Goetzmann (In re CIS Corp.), 195 B.R. 251, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
The purpose of the ordinary course of business exception "'is to leave undisturbed normal financial relations, because [such an exception] does not detract from the general policy of the preference section to discourage unusual action by either the debtor or his creditor during the debtor's slide into bankruptcy.'" Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 88 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874). All circuit courts considering the issue prior to BAPCPA required that the defendant prove all three distinct elements of the subsection: that the debts were incurred in the ordinary course of the debtor's and creditor's businesses; that the transfers were made within the ordinary course of dealings between the parties (a subjective