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Va. 1995), the debt was incurred due to mistake of the parties, resulting in much larger debt than was usual, was not incurred out of the ordinary course of their business where creditor continued to ship product to the debtor, the creditor was generally lenient with credit terms, and it was customary for large orders to be made in the industry. In so holding the court noted that [pre-BAPCPA] subsection (c)(2)(A) does not require that a transaction occur pursuant to a pattern, often, or even regularly. The only requirement is that the debt was incurred in such a manner that neither the debtor nor the creditor did anything unusual to gain advantage over other creditors.
In NMI Systems, Inc. v. Pillard (In re NMI Systems, Inc.), 179 B.R. 357 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1995), an employee's compensation-bonus package was a debt incurred incident to a plan adopted by the company and therefore was incurred the ordinary course of the debtor's business. The loan of funds from insiders to the debtor, however, did not satisfy the requirements of [pre-BAPCPA] 547(c)(2)(A) because the lending of the funds was not within the ordinary course of business of the insiders-lenders whose debt was repaid. Lawson v. Corrao Family LLC (In re Kelly's Chocolates, Inc.), 268 B.R. 345 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001). In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ex rel. Markham v. Lerner (In re Diagnostic Instrument Group, Inc.), 283 B.R. 87 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002), loans by an insider that is not in the business of making such loans takes it out of the ordinary course for purposes of [pre-BAPCPA] § 547(c)(2)(A).
Sections 547(c)(2)(A) and (B) create both a subjective test (ordinary as between the parties) and an objective test (ordinary in the industry). See, e.g., In re Midway Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 1995); Marshack v. Orange Commercial, Credit (In re Nat'l Lumber & Supply, Inc.), 184 B.R. 74 (9th Cir.
B.A.P. 1995); Gray v. Huntsman Chem. Corp. (In re Dooley Plastics Co.), 185 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (relying on WJM, Inc. v. Mass. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1988));
