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rather on more practical grounds, provided only that such differences were "just and reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrangement."
Code § 1122(a) expressly prohibits dissimilar claims being classified together. Perhaps this was primarily intended to ensure compliance with the absolute priority rule, like the principal classification rule under the Act. Perhaps it was also intended to preclude the kind of gerrymandering where a debtor packs a class with friendly votes to outvote the objectors. It does not, however, contain any express language indicating how similarity is to be determined for that purpose, not even "according to the nature" of the claims. Nor does the language suggest any prohibition or restriction on separate classification of similar claims, which was not uncommon under the Act.
Nor does the legislative history of the Code reveal whether Congress understood either the chapter X rule or the chapter XI rule to be the dominant model for § 1122. This would suggest that both models should have equal weight under the Code, but legislative history suggests that the chapter XI rule was intended to prevail. The Bankruptcy Commission's draft § 7-302 required designation of classes of claims "which are of substantially similar character and the holders of which enjoy substantially similar rights," noting that the "section is derived from §§ 197, 357 and 452 of the present Act." The Code's deletion of the Commission's reference to "rights" and chapter X's reference to "nature" of the claim, which had been thoroughly glossed by Gerdes' interpretation, suggests Congress intended the more liberal chapter XI standard. If that had not been the intent, Congress would have used a term of art that had an accepted and tested meaning for more than forty years, the "nature" of a claim.
The inference that § 1122 was intended to permit more flexible classification than based on legal rights is further supported by the Code's inclusion of the "unfair discrimination" standard in § 1129(b)(1). The legislative history clearly indicates this provision was intended to deal with claims having the same legal rights against the debtor,
