acceptance were "made or procured by means or promises forbidden by this Act." Act §§ 221(3), 366(4) and 472(4). The legislative history does not make clear the intent of this expanded scope. It may have been intended to refer to the bankruptcy crimes provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code, which make it a felony for anyone knowingly and fraudulently to give, offer, receive or attempt to obtain any money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage or promise thereof for acting or forbearing to act in a bankruptcy case. 18 U.S.C. § 152. Such an intended reference would make sense because it precludes bribery, extortion and any undisclosed compensation in connection with soliciting votes on a plan. If the law referred to must be a law that forbids the "means" of the "proposal" of a plan, it is difficult to determine what other kinds of law might be included, particularly since most securities laws are excluded by Code. §§ 1125(e) &1145. Possibly antitrust laws that would preclude a conspiracy that could be effectuated through a plan might be included, or other laws regulating the relationship between the proponent and the debtor. State laws governing corporate or partnership structure probably should not be included because they relate to the substance of a plan rather than the means of its proposal, and the substantive restructuring should be governed by Chapter 11 rather than state law.
Payments made or promised for services and expenses in or in connection with the case or plan or incident to the case must be approved by the court or subject to its approval as reasonable, if such payments are made or promised by the plan proponent, by the debtor, or by a person issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan. § 1129(a)(4). The specific confirmation requirement of court approval rather than just disclosure became effective with the 1984 amendments. The requirement is not limited to payments from assets of the estate, but requires court approval of any payments by the proponent, the debtor or by persons issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan. The Fifth Circuit has held this provision may apply to payment of expenses incurred in the confirmation process, even if paid from non-estate funds, but after-the-fact court approval is sufficient. The provision may also apply to post-confirmation services if in connection with the plan and in