under § 365(c)(2). The credit card processors faced financial risk if United's business activities gave rise to customer chargebacks, such as by flight cancellations, particularly if United could not satisfy those chargebacks. Joining the 11th Circuit, the 7th Circuit held that the agreement was not one where the non-debtor extends debt financing or financial accommodations to or for the benefit of the debtor. While the airline would be indebted to the consumers if its flights were cancelled, the processor was not loaning the airline money or guaranteeing its obligations. The court analogized the financial risk of the processor as similar to the non-debtor party under any contract where performance is not mutual. For example, the seller of goods may obtain payment before delivery. Such a contract is not treated as one for financial accommodations. Nor could the court condition the airline's assumption of the contract under § 365(b)(1), as United had not defaulted. This is an important practice point - where there has not been a default under a contract being assumed, the non-debtor party has no right to "adequate assurance of future performance" under § 365(b)(1)(C).
When is a use restriction in a shopping center lease unenforceable notwithstanding § 365(b)(3)(C)? In the view of the lower courts in TrakAuto Corp., "when the use restriction prohibits a debtor's assignment in violation of § 365(f)(l). Yet, what is the authority to ignore the specific shopping center provisions of §365(b)(3) in favor of general anti-assignment provisions of § 365(f)(l)? In the Fourth Circuit's view, there is no basis to do so, rather where two statutes address an issue, the more specific statute generally controls over the more general. So, while § 365(f)(1) is authority to invalidate an anti-assignment clause, it is not a basis to eviscerate the specific protections of a shopping center landlord under § 365(b)(3). The mere fact that assignment will result in greater