where there is no reasonable likelihood that the debtor would ever be able to repay the student loan.)
In re Nash, 446 F.3d 188 (1st Cir. April 26, 2006) (Debtor failed to prove undue hardship sufficient to entitle her to a discharge of student loans pursuant to § 523(a)(8), where her assertion of a bipolar-related disability was not accompanied by medical testimony regarding her future medical outlook and future earning potential.)
In re Nys, 446 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. April 26, 2006) (For discharge of student loans debt pursuant to § 523(a)(8), the debtor's mere inability to pay in the present and a likely inability to pay in the future are sufficient to constitute "exceptional circumstances" required by second prong of Brunner undue hardship test.)
Peeler v. MCI, Inc., 447 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. May 8, 2006) (Pre-petition claim for compensation for debtor's installation and use of telecommunications equipment on claimant's property was discharged. Claims arising from post-petition trespasses to repair the equipment could still be adjudicated.)
Egleston v. Egleston (In re Egleston), --- F.3d ----, 2006 WL 1195995 (5th Cir. May 5, 2006) (State court's post-petition order was void under § 524(a)(1) to the extent it was a determination of debtor's liability for discharged debt. State court had entered marital settlement agreement between debtor and wife pre-petition, and wife obtained stay relief to enforce certain alimony payments required by the agreement. State court then entered several orders finding debtor in contempt for failure to pay various amounts. These orders were partially void under § 524(a)(1) to the extent they determined the debtor's liability for discharged debt. State court order requiring debtor to reimburse wife for expenses incurred traveling from Pennsylvania to Louisiana to defend in bankruptcy court the property settlement agreement was not void under § 524(a)(1) because the claim arose post-petition and was not subject to the discharge injunction under § 524(a)(1).)
U.S. v. White, 466 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. Oct. 11, 2006) (I.R.S. was not barred by automatic stay from assessing tax liability against Chapter 11 debtor postconfirmation but prior to the plan's effective date. The automatic stay did not survive confirmation of the debtor's plan; confirmation replaces the automatic stay with a permanent injunction pursuant to § 524, which did not apply to debtor's non-discharged tax debt. The delayed effective date of the plan did not delay the confirmation-triggered dissolution of the automatic stay, because plan terms govern the claims of holders of dischargeable debts only. The tax